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Understanding Results-based Conditionality in Development 
Cooperation: A Comparative Case Analysis 
Sukyung Park and Jae Sung Kwak
Growing concerns over aid effectiveness in recent years have changed views around the aid 
contract, in part the role of aid conditionality and its perceived limits. This research seeks answers 
to questions on how results-based conditionality has been applied by exploring the multiple results-
based aid programs through a case study from a comparative perspective. By investigating theoretical 
background on conditionality and reviewing recent discussions on results-based conditionality, this 
paper proposes a conceptual framework to discover key elements of results-based conditionality and 
to analyze them to see how the new approach may affect the process and result of aid delivery in 
comparison with traditional conditionality. The case analysis shows that results-based approach shifts 
the focus of aid by altering and strengthening the nature of incentives from various aspects of non-
financial incentives, selectivity, payment, performance management, and sustainability with varying 
degrees. The paper concludes with challenges and limitations of results-based approach.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background 
The results language has been in the use for many decades. Most notably, there was 
the Logical Framework first developed by the US Department of Defense in the 1960s to 
promote management by objectives, and the initiative of the Swedish National Audit Office 
in 1970 which emphasized that each agency had to be results-oriented and results-conscious. 
The results agenda came to occupy a position at the core of discussion in international 
development arena beginning in 2000. In 2002 Monterrey Conference on Financing for 
Development, it was agreed that a focus on results is the key to improving development 
effectiveness, and the results language has become more general in the sector since then. The 
DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness was set up in 2003, and the importance of results 
in aid was heavily discussed in the Paris Declaration on Effective Aid in 2005. In 2008, the 
World Bank’s Health Results Innovations Trust Fund (HRITF) was established, and USAID 
is rolling out payment by results approach in health and family planning programs. 
Development programs are increasingly being designed, implemented, and assessed 
within an evidence-based framework. One of the driving forces behind the results agenda 
is the “value for money” discourse (Eyben, 2013). With a pressing need to demonstrate that 
aid budgets are making differences during a period of austerity, results became part of the 
politics of accountability. It is not only related to the concerns of taxpayers about the lack 
of transparency and misuse of funds but generally to the effectiveness of aid. Another major 
driver is the competition for budget resources between domestic and multilateral aid agencies 
and other government departments. This trend makes organizations increase their efforts to 
demonstrate they are delivering value for money by proposing projects that can be easily 
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measured by adopting results and evidence framework. 
Despite the growing interest in results-based conditionality, it is still a new concept. 
Little theoretical or empirical study has been conducted. While the primary interest of 
researchers and practitioners stays concentrated on the tricky question whether results-
based conditionality works or not, there are other questions that may affect decisions about 
adopting results-based conditionality. Few studies have analyzed how the theory on which 
results-based conditionality is based is different and how their characteristics may exist in the 
actual aid programs. This study is an effort to respond to this curiosity. 
This paper is a qualitative inquiry that investigates the new approach in aid delivery 
practice and within its operational context through a case-study method, specifically from 
the perspective of its incentives and implementation schemes. The core elements of this 
study thus include understanding and interpretation and the policy implications of the new 
mechanism. 
1.2. Literature Review  
Results-based conditionality represents an attempt to extend results-based management 
(RBM) practices, which have become best practice within donor organizations, to their 
relationships with aid recipients (Dodsworth, 2012). RBM is currently defined in development 
cooperation as “a management strategy focusing on performance and achievement of outputs, 
outcomes and impact (OECD/DAC Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results 
Based Management 2002).” The basic idea behind RBM is that donors need performance 
information to understand and adapt to development contexts and make informed decisions. 
RBM covers various aspects of strategic planning, risk management, performance monitoring 
and evaluation, organizational learning, and reporting accountability. As there is an increased 
global and domestic pressure to prove results of aid, results requirements are increasingly 
being adopted as a conditionality for funding (Vähämäki et al., 2011). 
Figure 1. Traditional versus Results-based Approach
Source: Modified based on Birdsall et al. (2011: 23).
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There is no commonly agreed definition and the aid practice based on this approach. The 
names vary from ‘payment by results’ or ‘performance-based aid’ to ‘output-based aid’ to 
describe similar concepts (Pearson, 2011: 1). Despite the challenge related to the terminology, 
its key feature is that the provision of aid is only made once a pre-defined result is achieved 
according to the established method of payment. Another important feature is that the funder 
takes a hands-off approach. RBC thus may provide a possible approach that minimizes 
interference in the choice of policy actions and promises greater ownership (Koeberle et 
al., 2005) that emphasizes the power of incentives rather than guidance. In general terms, 
aid based on RBC is a new kind of partnership between a donor and a recipient government 
(Klingebiel, 2012). The main innovation of this type of aid is based on the establishment of 
a new contract that defines incentives to achieve measurable results and an appropriate set of 
indicators.
Conditionality has generated many contentious debates in the development community. 
The biggest question is whether conditionality from donors has led to better outcomes. A 
group of critics pointed to the potentially corrosive effect of conditionality with an increasing 
recognition of the limitations of the traditional approach (For example, Dollar and Svensson, 
2000; Easterly, 2005; Koeberle et al., 2005; Wood and Lockwood, 1999). 
Under current conditionality, recipient countries do not have strong incentives to achieve 
results. It is even possible that the recipient governments do not have any incentive to achieve 
results, as damaging policies create misery that is likely to draw more aid to alleviate the 
impoverished conditions (Williamson, 2010). Easterly (2007) argues that these governments 
explicitly want to keep down the productive capability of the poor due to the potential of 
political threat to the current regime. Additionally, special interest groups who benefit from a 
windfall of aid may resist any change that may reduce their financial gains.  
In practice, aid conditionality is not effectively enforced. Its practicality is eroded by 
challenges in monitoring compliance and by incentives for donors to keep disbursing funds 
despite poor reform efforts due to the domestic pressure to spend aid budget (Mosley et al., 
1995; Kanbur, 2006; Kanbur, 2000). The plausibility of threats of withdrawal of aid will be 
corroded if a donor has its own interest to provide funds, such as defensive lending (where 
donors grant new loans to help countries pay off old ones and to avoid default on past loans 
regardless of the reform results), donors’ own interest to pursue other than policy reforms, or 
domestic pressure to disburse aid budgets (Killick, 1997: 488). 
Killick (1997) showed evidence that non-compliance of conditionality is rarely penalized 
because donors are influenced by economic or political factors in their decision-making, or 
the pressure to disburse in aid agencies is obvious as the failure to do so would exacerbate 
macroeconomic crises and result in default on past loans and debt services. He also pointed 
out that inappropriate incentives within donor agencies, which tend to reward high funding 
levels, are also a major factor preventing effective sanctioning of non-implementation of 
conditionality. 
There is also a time-consistency problem (Scholl,  2009; Svensson, 2000) that aggravates 
the commitment problems which lead to the lack of enforcement. This problem arises where 
the incentive to keep the commitment for recipient governments is significantly less than the 
incentive to make the commitment. The incentives of governments to implement reforms 
and policy changes tend to weaken once aid is received, even when they agreed to the aid 
conditions. 
A consensus seems to exist that heavy donor involvement in the design and implementation 
of development assistance took away ownership from partner countries over the programs, 
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while it is a necessary condition for a sustained development outcomes. Ranis (1995) pointed 
out that conditionality works only when local governments have decided, largely on their 
own, possibly with technical assistance from outside. He emphasized that the reform needs 
and policy changes have to be derived internally, and financial resources can be sought from 
the international community to achieve these goals. 
Empirical studies suggest (Ostrom et al., 2001: 12) that without ownership, developing 
countries would undertake long-term policy reforms against what they consider to be their 
own interests, except for the receipt of aid. The policy change is thus regarded as the price 
which governments would have to pay for aid. Further, since donors saw their role as 
extracting maximum reform for a set amount of aid, the recipient government would always 
have an incentive to refuse to deliver the reform urged by donors. 
Another critique questions the sustainability of externally induced reforms based on 
conditionality. Many analysts argue that once the financing for a donor-supported adjustment 
program ends, reforms are often reversed or abandoned (Morrissey, 2004: 169). The poorest 
countries receiving aid are often the ones who lack the policy capacity. Under traditional 
conditionality where donors dictate the policy choice, recipients’ capacity to formulate its 
own strategy may be weakened while they are expected to design and implement highly 
sophisticated and often experimental policy programs. 
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1. Case Selection and Brief
During recent years, several forms of results-based instruments such as results-based 
financing or “hybrid” type of approach combining results-based aid and financing were 
introduced by aid agencies and development policy think tanks. Results-based financing 
approach is to contracting a service provider or incentivizing a beneficiary of services within 
a country which involves a national or local government body. For example, the well-known 
case of conditional cash transfer program, Bolsa Familia of Brazil, or UK’s Quality and 
Outcomes Framework could be a good example of the financing mechanism where payment 
is made to public services within a country for delivering a specific service output. Hybrid 
approach combines results-based aid and financing in which aid funds were used to contract 
directly with the NGOs or the private sector (e.g. World Bank Output-Based Aid). 
While results-based approach can take many forms, this paper intends to look at results-
based aid partnership between a donor and a partner country and thus excludes other results-
based instruments mentioned above. It also excluded some programs (e.g. Global Fund) 
designed to assess compliance using process indicators rather than performance indicators. 
This paper thus focuses on a subset of aid programs for the case study in which the measured 
results are closely linked to development performance according to the principle of results-
based conditionality. 
The three cases in this study are selected because i) the aid is provided to developing 
country government and ii) the payment is based on the performance of the partner 
government. While it tried to include a rich combination of results-based aid programs 
with various donor orientations and sectors, the pool of possible candidates is very limited 
provided that the approach is a relatively new one. Accordingly, this paper will review Gavi 
immunization support program, Millennium Challenge Account, and Payment by Results by 
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DFID.  
Gavi, as a global financing mechanism to improve access to vaccines in poor countries, 
provides a basic payment upfront and links only a part of funds to the outcome in incremental 
basis depending on the degree of performance. One of the first performance-based programs 
of its kind established in 2000, its ISS program has two main characteristics.1 The first is 
its results-based payment model. After an initial two years of investment funding, countries 
receive funding based on the additional number of children immunized. The second is the 
flexible nature of funding which allows governments spend funding as they decide most 
appropriate. 
MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) provides funding to eligible countries based 
on their performance on the selective indicators. MCC provides the committed and well-
performing countries in three areas of good governance, economic freedom, and investment 
in their citizens grants to fund their development programs. MCC provides two different 
types of compacts and threshold program: compacts are large, five-year grants for countries 
that pass MCC’s eligibility criteria while threshold programs are smaller-sized for those 
countries that come close to passing the benchmark and committed to improving their policy 
performance.
DFID (Department for International Development of the United Kingdom)’s payment by 
results similarly pays for results which are pre-set and verified upon completion and funds are 
used by recipients’ full discretion. PbR has three defining features: i) disbursements linked 
to the attainment of clearly specified results rather than payment for inputs or processes; ii) 
recipient discretion where the recipient has space to decide how results are achieved, thereby 
increasing the scope for innovation in how results are achieved; and iii) robust verification of 
results as the trigger for disbursement (Department for International Development, 2013). 
2.2. Analytic Strategies
Extracting Indicators
The method to obtain factors and indicators for case analysis was to apply the list of 
published literature which present empirical evidence on experiences from multilateral and 
bilateral donors as well as developing countries. The English language literature since 1995 
was reviewed for identifying the factors for this analysis. The literature was found with 
an online search using Journal Storage (JSTOR), Google Scholar, World Bank, IMF, and 
Center for Global Development. The key words used to locate relevant articles were “aid 
conditionality,” “failure (or success) of conditionality,” “performance of conditionality,” 
“assessing conditionality,” “conditionality effects,” and “conditionality evaluation.”
An initial list of 40 articles or reports was identified for further review. Both their abstracts 
and summaries were reviewed to discern whether the article was specifically related to aid 
conditionality and its performance. Each study was reviewed to identify the performance of 
aid conditionality and its determining factors through evidence-based analyses using various 
methods such as econometric analyses or case studies for a small or large number of country 
samples. Studies were excluded if they did not provide sound information on the performance 
1 ISS program has now been phased out and been replaced with a new performance-based funding 
scheme under the health systems strengthening (HSS) program. Under the new scheme, countries 
will receive an initial investment for the first year, and a portion of payments during subsequent years 
will depend on improvements in immunization coverage. 
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of conditionality, the contributing factors, or if they were not related to “aid” conditionality, 
but other types of conditionality not relevant to aid or development assistance.  
As a result, 23 literature were retained for extracting contributing factors (see Annex 
1). Table 1 is the list of key factors for success of conditionality cited in the literature. The 
advantage of this approach is that it provides already verified evidence on the performance of 
conditionality. The disadvantage is that some of the measures are subjective, and thus there 
is not necessarily a consensus among scholars. Despite this issue, this approach can benefit 
from the rigorous analysis with various methods such as econometric analyses or case studies 
for a large number of country samples.  
Case Analysis
This paper is a qualitative inquiry that investigates results-based approach and a case 
study method was applied for its exploratory nature to illuminate results-based conditionality. 
This research tries to answer “how” and “why” results-based approach was adopted and 
implemented, which facilitate the process to describe and understand the nature of the 
research topic. Accordingly, a case study method is relevant to “illuminate a decision or set of 
decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what results (Schramm, 
1971). This study will also be benefited from the prior foundation and development of 
conceptual and theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis. 
In the within-case analysis, this research will conduct an in-depth exploration of a single 




Alignment The objectives of partner governments and those of donors are consistent
Ownership/
Discretion
-  Partners are engaged in formulating and designing their own 
reform programs
-  Partners are given greater responsibility during implementation
- Donors take a hands-off approach
Selectivity Selectivity
-  A process to ensure that aid goes to favorable policy 
environment where aid will most enhance growth and reduce 
poverty
Payment Results-based payment
- Payments are closely linked to ex-post performance




indicators -  The objective set of indicators agreed on measure performance
Results verification - Methods to verify results
M&E - Monitoring and evaluation strategies and policy framework
Sustainability Financial sustainability
-  Partner countries are financially ready or encouraged to 
contribute to secure resources for future development efforts
Operational 
sustainability
-  Partner countries have the long-term ability to implement the 
reforms on their own
Source: author’s elaboration based on literature
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case as a standalone entity. Within-case analysis will be thoroughly focusing on the data 
within each case to find out its unique attributes and patterns. The purpose is to discern 
how operational strategies and implementation patterns that are found in the particular case 
support, refute, or expand the theoretical proposition on results-based conditionality. 
Cases will then be analyzed with a cross-case method that facilitates the comparison of 
commonalities and differences among cases. Through cross-case analysis, this study intends 
to delineate the combination of factors that constructed unique operational aspects of each 
case and then seek an explanation as to where the differences among cases are derived. At the 
end of the case analysis also presents some insights from the field evaluation studies how the 
actual RBA projects have been implemented. 
Based on the analysis conducted, the study will construct an explanation by comparing 
the findings of cases against the initial theoretical foundation about the results-based 
conditionality in the earlier chapter. In addition, cases will also be compared to find out 
differences among them and to seek explanations why the gap appears. This way makes it 
possible to build an understanding of policy implications of this approach by identifying the 
appropriate combination of incentives, design features, and enabling/inhibiting factors to 




(1) Non-financial incentives 
Gavi takes country ownership seriously and does not impose specific requirements how 
programs are to be implemented or how funds are to be used. According to the evaluation 
of the ISS program conducted in 2007, recipients noted the benefits of the flexibility of ISS 
funds-ISS funding flexibility allowed governments to address acute funding shortfalls and to 
adopt internationally-recognized strategies for improving immunization coverage (Chee et 
al., 2007). 
Gavi fosters country ownership through its business model. Under the Alliance’s funding 
mechanism, countries take the lead in proposing programs for Gavi funding, deciding what 
support to apply for and when. Gavi’s support is committed for the duration of national health 
and immunization plans to ensure that Gavi support satisfies countries’ health priorities. 
Another example of country-led partnership is that countries propose their own solutions for 
improving their health systems to deliver vaccines and promote immunizations where and to 
the extent they are needed (‘About Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance,’ 2015).
One of the unique and most valued characteristics of ISS funding is the complete 
flexibility and discretion given to national immunization programs (NIPs) regarding how 
and when to fund the program. Most countries have dedicated Gavi accounts so that funds 
were not mixed with other funding. It allows NIPs to operationalize locally-appropriate 
strategies for improving performance to respond the pressing health problems in the country. 
The decision making on the planning, budgeting, and allocation of the ISS funds can be done 
either at central authority level and local district level based on district micro-plans (‘Gavi 
Immunization Service Support’ n.d.). The central or local level set the priority activities 
or strategies and district flexibility in programming cash funding varies by country and by 
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activity. For example, countries exercise flexibility in various ways: providing an incentive 
program to motivate staff given the low government salaries and support from central 
government; filling a gap in outreach funding; covering an unexpected shortage of costs; or 
supporting other health programs where no donor funding was provided (Chee et al., 2007). 
Selectivity
Gavi’s application process is facilitative as its goal is to make it easy for countries to 
obtain funding (Chinedu and Beswick, 2009: 42). Countries must present evidence that 
the proposed activities are fully integrated with the national planning and budget process. 
Countries must also have a well-functioning intra-agency coordination committee or national 
health sector coordinator, and a comprehensive multi-year plan synchronized with the 
strategic plan of the health sector that analyzes the state of the immunization program and 
current and future costing and financing, and a plan to minimize waste, maximize retention 
and improve safety.
There are two principles of selectivity with Gavi’s program. First, in terms of eligibility 
threshold, Gavi’s eligibility criteria focus Gavi support on the poorest countries. Countries 
with GNI per capita below or equal to $1,580 as of 2015 according to the World Bank data 
are eligible to apply for vaccines and other relevant grants and the GNI threshold is adjusted 
annually for inflation. Second, “program filters” for accessing new vaccine support are 
designed to ensure minimum performance standards and encourage high vaccine coverage. 
In terms of program filter, countries with 70% or more coverage of DTP3 (Diphtheria-
tetanus-pertussis) area allowed to apply for new vaccine support. For Japanese encephalitis, 
Meningitis A and Yellow Fever vaccines, all Gavi -eligible countries can apply for grants 
regardless of DTP coverage (‘Gavi Alliance Country Eligibility Policy,’ 2009). 
(2) Results-based payment
Gavi utilizes performance-based incentives with a purpose to ensure health financing is 
effective, accountable, and transparent. Incentives focus on outcomes, reward solutions and 
managing results of health programs (‘Gavi Immunization Service Support,’ 2015). 
Under ISS, Gavi offers support in a reward phase, which begins from the third year after 
grant approval (in the first two years of grant, disbursement is based on the estimates in the 
proposal). Payments are calculated based on the country’s achievements in immunization 
targets surpassing the previous year (year 2). The indicator is the number of additional 
children aged less than one year who have vaccinated compared to the baseline. Countries 
receive rewards only if they have provided additional immunization for children, and verify 
the number of children immunized through passing a Data Quality Audit (DQA) of 80 
percent verification factor (Chee et al., 2007). 
The performance payments are calculated from immunization data provided by 
governments’ administrative reporting systems. Countries receive a fixed payment of $20 
per additional child immunized to reach up to an 80 percent coverage level and $25 when 
countries achieve beyond the 80 percent threshold. Failure to immunize additional children, 
or to achieve an 80 percent verification factor in DQA results in no rewards (Perakis and 
Savedoff, 2015: 17-18; Chee et al., 2007: 1). 
(3) Performance management 
Gavi requires that countries applying for all types of support have a certain mechanism to 
independently collect, assess, and report the quality data and countries must indicate whether 
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they have the system in place as part of application process (“Gavi IRC Review Criteria for 
2016,” 2016).
Specifically, the data system requirements are in two folds: i) routine mechanisms to 
independently assess the quality of administrative data and track changes in data quality, with 
relevant reports, summary measures, and data quality improvement plans; and ii) high quality 
and nationally representative household surveys conducted at appropriate intervals to assess 
immunization coverage and equity.
Countries applying to Gavi submit Annual Progress Reports to provide information on 
performance and targets to the monitoring team of the Gavi Independent Review Committee 
(IRC) and the IRC makes recommendations about the continuation of program support. 
Parallel to this, Gavi has set up a monitoring and evaluation framework and strategy to 
ensure that valid and reliable measures of performance are available and support organization 
learning, management of strategy, improvement of programs, and reporting of performance. 
(4) Sustainability
Gavi takes a co-financing approach to encourage countries to plan sustainable 
immunization program in the financial aspect. It aims to assist countries with their long-
term planning towards financial sustainability to prepare them to exit from the Gavi support 
beyond the first five years. The co-financing policy is effective since 2007 and all countries 
that apply for Gavi support should contribute to new vaccines depending on the level of 
national income. 
Country co-financing groups and the co-financing requirement are: low-income2 countries 
contribute a flat amount of $0.20 per dose with no annual increase independent of the price of 
the vaccine used; intermediate countries3 start at $0.20 per dose and increases 15% annually; 
and graduating countries4 start at an additional 20 percent of the difference between the 
forecasted price on the vaccine Gavi support ends and the co-financing amount per dose paid 
in the coming year, and increases linearly over four years to reach the projected price (‘About 
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance,’ 2015).5 
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
(1) Non-financial incentives
MCC’s understanding on country ownership is a “partnership” approach based on mutual 
accountability. It means that country discretion and ownership are encouraged, but they are 
only meaningful within MCC mandates and standards for accountability, transparency, and 
impact, rather than in open-ended structure (Lucas, 2011: 1). There is no sector earmarks 
or directives and governments decide to work in the sector according to reflect their own 
priorities. However, this process is done in an effort to keep the balance between MCC’s 
principles and operational principles (Lucas, 2011: 13-15). 
Under the MCC’s ownership model, country counterparts are responsible for implementing 
MCC-funded programs. Partner governments establish MCAs6 as local implementing 
2 GNI per capita at or below the World Bank low-income threshold, currently $1,035.
3 GNI per capita above the World Bank low-income threshold but below the Gavi eligibility threshold 
currently >$1,035 to <$1,570.
4 GNI per capita above the Gavi eligibility threshold currently $1,570. 
5 http://www.gavialliance.org/about/governance/programme-policies/co-financing/
6 MCA (Millennium Challenge Account) is a local, country-owned entity set up to manage and oversee 
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agencies while MCC has few field missions, and they are accountable to their domestic 
stakeholders as well as boards of directors or similar entities such as government officials 
and representatives of civil society organizations and the private sector. These partnerships 
can give existing government entities a critical role in program implementation as well as 
opportunities for capacity building. 
(2) Selectivity
MCC exemplifies donors’ increasing selectivity in favor of good performers (Herrling 
and Radelet, 2006: 3). To be eligible for MCC compact funding, MCC assesses the extent 
to which the political, social, and economic conditions in a country advocate broad-based 
sustainable growth. In this decision-making process, three factors are considered by the 
Board: performance on the defined policy criteria, the opportunity to reduce poverty and 
generate economic growth in the country, and funds available to MCC. The country’s 
previous performance with MCC is also taken into consideration. 
Candidate countries are first identified based on their GNI per capita: as for the fiscal year 
2016, a candidate country must be either low-income category (LIC) (countries with a per 
capita income between $0 and $1,985) or low middle income (LMIC) category (countries 
with a per capita income between $1,986 and $4,125). MCC ranks potential recipients on 
their commitment to rule justly, invest in the people, and promote economic growth using 
various indicators such as civil liberties, public expenditure on health, or business start-
up (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2015). The MCC sets the selection criteria on the 
basis of data, which comes from independent and transparent third-party sources including 
Freedom House, the World Bank, WHO, UNESCO, IFC, and the Heritage Foundation 
(Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2013). 
To “pass” the indicators on the scorecard, the country must perform above the median 
among its income group, except in the cases of inflation, political rights, civil liberties, and 
immunization rates (LMICs only), where threshold scores have been set up. Specifically, the 
Board considers whether the country: i) passed at least 10 of the 20 indicators, with at least 
one in each category; passed the “Control of Corruption” indicator, and iii) passed either the 
“Political Rights” or “Civil Liberties” indicator (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 2015).
(3) Results-based payment
MCC provides the well-performing countries that meet the criteria for large-scale grants 
to fund country-led programs. There are two primary types of grants: compacts and threshold 
programs. Compacts are large, five-year grants for countries to pass MCC’s eligibility criteria 
and threshold programs are smaller grants awarded to countries that come close to passing 
these criteria and are committed to improving their policy environments. 
The five-year grants are committed upfront to increase aid predictability while 
disbursements are made based on quarterly Disbursement Request (DR) and other reporting 
packages submitted by the recipients. The information required for funding is program 
execution, financial management, procurement actions, as well as progress towards compact 
goals as defined in M&E indicators. Consistent with the results-based approach to managing 
the Compact, disbursement of funds is linked to performance and it is defined by a set of 
all aspects of implementation, including overseeing the MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) 
program and its components, allocating resources, overseeing and implementing a financial plan, 
approving expenditures and procurements, and being accountable for MCC program results.
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indicator targets in the Compact M&E Plan. 
(4) Performance Management
MCC monitors progress towards compact results on a regular basis using performance 
indicators detailed in the M&E plan based on the MCC “Policy for Monitoring and 
Evaluation of Compacts and Threshold Programs” (Millennium Challenge Corporation, 
2012). Every country adopts the Compact M&E Plan as a central framework for monitoring 
and evaluating the compact’s activities to assess progress towards results. Establishment of 
the M&E plan begins during compact development and it is completed around the outset of 
compact implementation.  After a Compact is signed, the partner country’s accountable party 
(also called as MCA) and MCC finalize the M&E plan. The data used for monitoring and 
reporting performance comes from baseline and follow-up surveys, project implementers and 
other local resources. All the collected data is subject to a regular quality control managed by 
the MCAs and monitored by MCC to ensure its integrity and accuracy.
(5) Sustainability
MCC purposely invests in systems to build inclusive country capacity and the key way 
of doing this is strengthening monitoring and evaluation (M&E) capacity in the partner 
countries. MCC provides assistance to help countries to set up a better M&E system in 
particular. As M&E practice is new to many of recipient governments, the standard M&E 
budget template for all compacts includes M&E training. This is primarily to ensure that 
project implementers learn about and can apply best practices in M&E during and after the 
compact using tools such as economic analysis, impact evaluation, and M&E information 
systems. It also serves as an indispensable tool to track the progress of grant programs. 
DFID Payment by Results (PbR) 
(1) Non-financial incentives
DFID does not put any restrictions on the use of funds provided to the partner 
governments and the funds can be used at the full discretion by the principles of results-based 
aid to further improve the results being tracked. Partner government makes decisions on the 
use of funds while DFID retains the right to access audited financial statements prepared 
by recipients to verify that the funds received have been declared and used to support the 
country program. 
The design of the PbR program is based on bottom-up approach led by the country office 
in consultation with the PbR guidelines as per the interview with DFID official managing 
PbR program. The evaluation on the RBA pilot program in Rwanda also provides evidence 
that a high degree of ownership is evident at senior level and the agreement was aligned 
with the priorities and policies of GoR. Many respondents agreed that money is not the 
only motivator as it is not a huge amount, but it is the “prestige” and results orientation and 
commitment to achieving targets through the pilot project (Upper Quartile, 2014). 
(2) Selectivity
The selection criteria for PbR is set under broader guidelines on the UK’s partnership 
principles with developing country governments as well as budget support policy. The shared 
commitment to three objectives expected for an effective partnership is: reducing poverty and 
achieving MDGs; respecting human rights and other international obligations; and enhancing 
financial management and accountability, reducing the risk of funds being misused through 
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weak administration or corruption (DFID, 2005: 8). 
The UK will consider reducing or interrupting aid under the circumstances in which: 
countries deteriorate significantly away from agreed development objectives; countries are in 
significant violation of human rights or other international obligations; or there is a significant 
breakdown in partner country’s financial management and accountability that increase the 
risk of funds being misappropriated through weak administration or corruption (often called 
as fiduciary conditionality) (DFID, 2005: 3).7
(3) Results-based payment 
According to the interview with DFID informants, while there is no concrete “formula” to 
decide the size of a price or reward for PbR programs, the bottom line is balancing between 
the total price paid and other associated costs and the benefits expected to be created. The 
process to agree on the size of funding is more based on informed negotiation between 
DFID and partner countries, which emphasizes the key feature of DFID as a transformative 
approach to the new partnership. Principles to consider during the negotiation include the 
level of risk, existing incentives, expected return, as well as the level of existing finance from 
other donors. 
Payment triggers can vary in PbR contracts, but typical models include: first, where 
payment is “all or nothing” based on the degree of achievement; and frequency where 
payment is made for each beneficiary or service user who achieves a specified result such 
as an individual child passing an exam. The extent of a PbR component thus can also 
vary per contract: 100 percent PbR means all payment is dependent on the achievement 
of the specified results. The level of PbR can also be lowered as in the case of DFID Girls 
Education Challenge projects, which has 10 percent of PbR meaning that only payment of 
the final 10 percent of the contract value is dependent on the achievement of results.
In practice, two pilot projects have been conducted in the education sector in Ethiopia and 
Rwanda. The payments are calculated at the district level and by gender, and that negatives 
(decreases in a number of examination sitters) are omitted from the calculation. For each 
additional child sitting the P6 (year 6 primary) exam above the previous year’s results, 
DFID pays the Government of Rwanda £50. In addition to this payment, in years 2014 
and 2015, DFID also paid the Government of Rwanda £10 for each additional child sitting 
the P6 examination above 2011 levels (Upper Quartile, 2014). Payment structure was also 
determined in a way that the varied amount of reward (“unit price”) upon the grade (ranging 
between £30 and £100) was to be multiplied by the number of students sitting exam. 
(4) Performance Management
The Rwanda pilot program’s payments are subject to the independent verification of the 
results. The first verification was undertaken in 2013 and produced data related to completion 
based on examinations data (Upper Quartile, 2014: 14). The arrangement under which the 
funds are disbursed is set out in the MoU with a developing country as well as DFID’s 
Partnership Commitments. For example, a pilot project performed as a results-based aid in 
Rwanda for education sector requires accurate and reliable data as a trigger for payments. 
7 Also refer to a news story “Rwanda: UK freezes budget support to government” < https://www.gov.
uk/government/news/rwanda-uk-freezes-budget-support-to-government> and “Malawi aid freeze 
could hut health and education sectors” < http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/
jan/14/malawi-aid-freeze-health-education>
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Payments will only be made upon independently verified results, and DFID hires an external 
contractor to perform this work in consultation with the government. The external contractor 
collaborates with GoR to check the systems for collecting and reporting exam participation 
rates and verify the GoR baseline and end assessment of teacher competence in the English 
language.  GoR will provide DFID and designated verification and evaluation teams with full 
access to any data required to verify results achieved. 
3.2. Cross-Case Analysis
Non-financial incentives
Discretion and ownership is a key feature of results-based conditionality and they 
were universally visible in all cases. The authority is given to recipients in various aspects 
of design, proposal, implementation, and allocation of aid while the degree varies across 
programs. Its spectrum is also wide from full-control on partner country’s side to with-in 
donor’s guidelines and boundaries on where and how the aid will be spent.  
For example, Gavi does not restrict on the allocation of aid in partner countries or on how 
to run the vaccination program in the field except it restricts the use of aid in health sector. 
Similarly, DFID places only minimal guidelines for PbR programs through Partnership 
Commitments and recipients own the authority to decide how the money can be used. In the 
case of MCC, governments have a choice to choose sectors deemed most appropriate for 
them but its discretion on the use of aid is not completely open-ended and remains within the 
boundaries of MCC’s standards and mandates.
Selectivity
One of the common features of selectivity shown in some cases is their clear focus on 
the countries that are expected and prepared to implement and show results. MCC is the 
example of donors’ strong selectivity in favor of good performers by reviewing governments’ 
performance on various policy indicators to decide whether a recipient is eligible for grants.
Another commonality is the focus on the poorest countries with a higher requirement 
for support and lack of resources. In combination with other selectivity criteria, country 
income status or other program indicators related to the program is used to determine the 
neediest ones. In case of Gavi, the focus is on the poorest countries with stronger needs for 
new vaccine support. Gavi also explains that one of its business challenges include getting 
vaccines on the agenda and rapidly accelerating vaccines in developing countries. To meet 
this business goal, selectivity is accordingly designed to provide minimum performance 
standards and encourage high program coverage.  
Meanwhile, the spectrum of selectivity varies across cases. Sometimes the eligibility 
criteria are set at the broader level of partnership or budget support guidelines (for example, 
DFID PbR) while other cases have narrower and specific set of factors to be eligible for aid 
(e.g. Gavi and MCC). Some selectivity measures are more competitive, and others are rather 
facilitative with a minimum level of performance standards. 
Figure 2 shows how various selectivity adopted by each case can be positioned within 
this range of broader-narrower and facilitative-competitive spectrums. Broader selectivity 
includes some conditions or status of a system such as macroeconomic policies or 
procurement system while narrower selectivity uses more detailed and specific indicators that 
can often be translated into numbers or scores. Facilitative selectivity implies that the process 
of screening eligible countries is rather open to those countries in need while the competitive 
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process has rather a high threshold to pass to get funding.
Results-based payments
The single most outstanding feature of RBC payment is that it always depends on the 
level of achievement, and it works as performance-based incentives. With a stronger focus 
on results, funds are not tied either to particular inputs (e.g. teacher training, textbooks) or 
intermediate outputs (e.g. number of schools built).
However, there is variance in terms of the way aid is provided. First, the amount of 
total payment varies: some programs reimburse the costs of the program and provide the 
additional rewards depending on the level of achievement while others only provide rewards 
or subsidize some of the program costs. The amounts paid can be larger or smaller relative 
to domestic budgets or other foreign aid resources. When payment amounts are small, 
relative to unit costs or other funding sources, they still signal changes in outcomes that may 
be useful for management or accountability but their impact via pecuniary interests will be 
attenuated (Perakis and Savedoff, 2015).
Second, the proportion of fixed and variable portion of aid: some may give all aid in 
performance-based aid type only while others combine with existing aid such as general 
or sectoral budget support. Some donors may take the “all or nothing” approach where 
whole payment is depending on the achievement level. When targets are not met, there is no 
payment. In other cases, partial payment is made to partial achievement and only a certain 
portion of the contract value is dependent on achievement. 
Third, when it comes to payment formula, it can generally be categorized either as 
“threshold” or “incremental”: threshold is when countries get paid as long as they pass the 
Figure 2. Selectivity Spectrum
Note: MDGs (Millennium Development Goals); PFM (Public Financial Management)
Source: author’s own elaboration.
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pre-agreed targets while incremental approach pays for any marginal improvements partner 
countries make. 
Table 2 below summarizes all the variables related to payment/disbursement in RBA 
programs. 
Performance Management
Performance management of results-based aid programs can be seen from the aspects of 
indicators, results verification, and M&E system. One common feature across all cases is that 
RBA programs require partner countries to be prepared with a certain level of the system to 
collect, analyze, and report performance data as a prerequisite to enter into aid contracts. In 
the preparation of a contract, the donor and partner government identify an area or a specific 
objective which is important for the country’s development process. Then they should agree 
upon a measurable and continuous results and an appropriate indicator or set of indicators. 
Baseline data should be available or collected. The data collection and analysis process for 
the verification of results should also be agreed with a “price per unit of progress” which will 
service as a basis of reward payment upon achieving the results. 
M&E framework and strategy plays a key role in most RBA programs to ensure that valid 
measures of performance are available and to support organization learning, management of 
strategy, improvement of program, and reporting of performance. M&E contract is a binding 
document and includes relevant performance indicators, targets, measurement plan, and 
reporting schedule.
The other common feature is how indicators are set up in each case. Performance 
indicators are all set up before the aid contract begins. Furthermore, in most of the cases, 
results-based aid programs use numeric or quantifiable targets such as number of additional 
children immunized, coverage ratio, number of children completing key stages basic 
education, or number of farmers trained in commercial agriculture. The focus on quantitative 
performance indicators over qualitative ones are understandable for which it is possible 
to provide readily available data and relatively easy to track down records. Once data is 
collected and submitted by the partner country, donor country is responsible to verify the 
validity and reliability of data either on its own through an internal audit committee or the 
independent third party in partnership with a partner government. 




Upfront payment + 
rewards
Large scale grants (compacts 
and threshold program)
Various range of funding 
depending on the contracts
Calculation of 
payment
$20 x number of 
additional immunized Passing eligibility criteria









by external contractors in 
consultation with government 
(Results Compact) 
Source: author’s own elaboration.
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Sustainability 
Sustainability can be first seen from a financial aspect and predictability of aid. Provided 
that the nature of results-based conditionality closely linked to performance payment, its 
potential to increase aid predictability is significantly weak. Most of the cases keep their 
emphasis on rewarding results by providing a stronger incentive for governments to commit 
and implement and stay true to the principle of RBC. 
However, there is a possibility to some extent to keep the balance between the two 
seemingly conflicting aims. For example, Gavi takes a co-financing approach to encourage 
countries to plan sustainable immunization program in the financial aspect. Its co-financing 
policy aims to assist countries with their long-term planning towards financial sustainability 
in order to prepare them to exit from Gavi support beyond the first five years. The co-
financing should represent new and additional financing and thus countries should not use 
funds allocated for financing other vaccines. DFID to a lesser degree have a potential to 
achieve better financial sustainability through the formula that allows a higher portion of 
guaranteed payment while lowering the volatile performance pay.
3.3. From the Field 
This sub-chapter first presents an evaluation study (Upper Quartile, 2014) related to the 
impact of DFID RBA pilot project in Rwanda (2012-2014) to promote school completion and 
teachers’ proficiency in English. The findings are structured around two key parts in terms 
of impact and process-related questions. The study found that there has been strong annual 
growth in completion at three key stages of school, although it is hard to link the precise 
attribution with RBA. The study clearly demonstrates the complexity of many “intervening” 
factors that contributed to the results and thus contextual understanding is critical. Awareness 
of and government ownership of RBA was high at the national level and the new approach 
has been received positively. 
Gavi’s ISS program results were also evaluated (CEPA LLP & Applied Strategies, 2010): 
its selectivity benefited the poorest countries while fragile countries were disadvantaged 
from attaining coverage targets to be eligible for funding. The study also found some 
mixed evidence of a positive impact of ISS disbursements on DTP3 coverage depending 
on the initial coverage ratio, which makes attribution of RBA to the results puzzling. It also 
suggested that Gavi’s Data Quality Audit system has positively influenced the improvement 
of national data management system and capacity. 
4. CONCLUSION
Results-based conditionality emerged from results agenda as a way to improve 
development effectiveness which drove key international development arena such as UN 
and OECD since 2000.  Domestic pressure to prove “value for money” of aid budget 
amid growing competition over funding also accelerated the discourse over the role of 
conditionality. This trend was in conjunction with the pessimism over the performance of 
traditional conditionality and an attempt to reverse the old approach. 
Findings from the case analysis suggest some commonalities and differences. In terms of 
non-financial incentives and performance management, programs share similar characteristics 
while meaningful gaps were found mainly from selectivity and payment aspects. RBC did 
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not seem to have the strong incentives in the aspect of sustainability. 
In regards to selectivity, some donors use rather facilitative measures with less strict 
selectivity while others impose a higher level of selectivity. We found that this is much 
related to the background as well as the operational objectives of each program: Gavi’s 
ISS program was initiated at a time when financial incentives were rare among health care 
programs and its target countries are developing countries with greater needs to rapidly 
accelerate vaccines. MCC emerged as one of the major post-9/11 foreign aid initiatives in 
the US as a tool for counteracting global poverty and terrorism. There is a strong association 
between poverty and terrorism, and higher selectivity intends to focus on the fundamental 
change how the country invests and delivers economic assistance. 
There is a variance related to the nature of payment scheme of each program. While 
it is common to have a stronger linkage between performance and aid, some programs 
(PbR) rather aim to change the nature in their partnership with stronger alignment and 
motivation through results focus. In this case, aid is not purely performance-driven as it has 
a higher proportion of fixed or guaranteed payment than other RBA programs in addition to 
performance-based tranche, and they also adopt partial payment scheme. The logic can be 
explained from the fact that PbR emerged not as an entirely new product but evolved from 
reflections of policy-based conditionality in combination with existing support with a stronger 
focus on results. This approach helps to avoid damaging “stop-go” in aid disbursement and 
enhance the credibility of disbursement conditions (GBS Guidelines 2007, developed from 
earlier 2003 guidance note) while enables soft-transition to results-based conditionality. 
Others (Gavi) put more emphasis on the actual performance level and it is more conditional 
in that sense. There is a higher risk as under-performance is not paid and the payment scheme 
is more “pass-fail”. MCC is rather a unique case in between where give-year grans are 
guaranteed for better aid stability, but actual disbursement is subject to quarterly reporting 
requirements. 
Overall, results-based aid seems to have stronger incentives than other aid modalities: its 
hands-off approach encourages governments to be more involved and “own” the reforms; 
stronger focus on results-focused framework to achieve key milestones may encourage better 
performance management; selectivity may work to reinforce recipients put more effort to 
meet the eligibility which would qualify them for aid; stronger enforcement potential with 
results-based payment provides incentives to commit and implement; and internalized M&E 
system may contribute to sustainability. 
Despite the potentials and benefits which make this new approach attractive, this research 
find several tensions on how the conceptual design feature of results-based aid intersects with 
practical implementation challenges. 
First, RBC leaves a question if it provides enough incentives for governments to join 
and remain in the contract despite the uncertain nature of the financial rewards. To be able to 
do so, it would need to be sufficiently predictable for developing countries to enter into the 
results-based aid contracts by expected financial flows. 
Second, another challenge arises with the payment strategy depending on the level 
of outcome or lack of it. When missing one of many targets would jeopardize the entire 
possibility of receiving aid, this would make the aid contract improbable. RBC holds a strong 
assumption that a change in behavior is required to pay. If, however, there exist barriers 
affecting the performance, then paying for performance alone will not be effective without 
addressing the challenges. 
Third, results-based approaches do not remove the risk involved in aid delivery 
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mechanism itself but just change its nature. Unlike traditional conditionality that focuses on 
fiduciary concerns related to aid, results-based approach shift the nature of the risks towards 
the integrity of reporting systems whether the results presented to donors are real (Pearson, 
2011).
Fourth, the unpredictability of results-based conditionality creates stress on recipients’ 
side. While some results-based programs such as MCC are designed to increase the level 
of aid predictability, RBC poses an inherent conflict between strong performance-based 
payment mechanism and the assurance that certain amount of aid will be provided. 
Fifth, disincentive related to selectivity might discriminate those countries that need 
aid the most and less prepared to bring results. When rigorous selectivity criteria and high 
eligibility standards are applied, it is unclear if those countries would be incentivized to 
pursue their efforts to meet the bars to get aid. There is a question otherwise if they should 
rather be disregarded and another type of aid flows should compensate the possible loss of 
aid opportunity. This double-track approach may undermine the case for results-based aid 
given that governments know that they will receive aid regardless of their performance (De 
Renzio and Woods, 2008). 
Some issues were reported where recipient countries inflate the number of children 
immunized or manipulate vaccine coverage data to boost the amount of money in Gavi 
program (Sternberg, 2008; Lim et al., 2008). Some argue that the inherent cause of over-
reporting is not due to the incentive system itself, but the absence of effective reporting and 
monitoring system to improve data collection and verify a significant data variance (Sternberg, 
2008). 
Considering these challenges, it is important to identify the sets of circumstances, 
enabling and inhibiting factors under which RBC most likely brings about behavioral 
changes. To determine the level and nature of incentives required to generate such change, 
detailed design features and its relationship to performance should be carefully looked at. 
It involves a discussion on the level and type reward, payment, selection criteria, as well 
as results verification methods and the interaction among them. Furthermore, possible 
interactions with other existing and future aid programs should be considered. RBC is not 
applicable to any situation but only those occasions where clear attribution outcomes are 
available and baseline date and appropriate counterfactual can be constructed. 
Results-based conditionality in foreign aid is a relatively new approach and little 
theoretical or empirical study has been performed on this topic. This research advances the 
growing interest on results-based conditionality by providing important insights on the nature 
of the new concept. It provides a useful conceptual and practical insight by suggesting a new 
analytical design to demonstrate the core factors of RBC and its incentive system, particularly 
from comparative perspectives between traditional and new conditionality. This research will 
also enhance understanding of potentials and challenges of implementing results-based aid 
programs.  
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Annex 1. Factors for Success as Presented in the Conditionality Literature
Literature Evidences from Factors




Collier, 1999 World Bank loan conditionalities Ownership, enforcement, motivation
Leandro et al., 
1999
Poor growth performance associated with 
adjustment programs in sub-Saharan Africa 
(37 sub-Saharan African countries)
Ownership, country-specific 
conditionality, aid predictability
IMF, 2001 Overly pervasive conditionality on IMF programs Ownership, country-specific conditionality
Khan and 
Sharma, 2003




Bird and Willet, 
2004






Review of 57 World Bank Development Policy 
Operations during FY2007
Ownership, country-specific 
conditionality, aid predictability, 
M&E, results-focus
Dreher, 2002
Compliance with World Bank conditionality and 




Toonen et al., 
2009
Case studies (Burundi, DRC, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Rwanda) Country-specific conditionality
Mosley et al., 
1995
World Bank structural adjustment loans in 1980s 
(conditional on macroeconomic policy reforms)
Enforcement/credibility, Favorable 
policy environment in recipient 
countries
Collier et al., 
1997




Determinants of success or failure of the 200 
World Bank structural adjustment programs
Favorable policy environment in 
recipient countries
Svensson, 2003 Study on a simple reform that introduces ex-post incentives based on World Bank cases
Favorable policy environment in 
recipient countries, M&E, results-
focus
Wood & 
Lockwood, 1999 Studies on new donor approach to conditionality 




Assessing the role of performance indicators and 
their impact on the aid contract between donors 
and the government of Uganda
Performance indicators
Selbervik, 1999 Case studies on the role of conditionality based on Norwegian-Tanzanian aid relationship M&E, results-focus
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Literature Evidences from Factors
Birdsall et al., 
2002
Effects of the application of selection criteria 




Examination on the MCA’s potentials and pitfalls 
through a rigorous analysis the issues related to 
the determinants of its success or failure
Selectivity, sustainability/capacity, 
ownership, 
Hansen & Tarp, 
2000
A survey of empirical analyses on the policy 
conditionality and growth based on 131 cross-
country regressions for 30 years
Favorable policy environment in 
recipient countries
Ivanova et al., 
2003
Econometric investigation on the IMF program 
implementation and conditionality
Favorable policy environment in 
recipient countries
Grabbe, 2001 Selectivity, recipient competition
Johnson and 
Zajonc, 2006 
An estimation of MCC conditionality’s incentive 
effects
Selectivity, recipient competition, 
Favorable policy environment in 




Estimating a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income 
countries, for the period 1982–2001 M&E, enforcement/credibility
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